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LIVING PROBATE: THE 
CONSERVATORSHIP MODEL 
John H. Langbein*t 
Within the last year or so there has been a considerable re-
vival of interest in the subject of living probate. In 1977 the state 
of North Dakota enacted the first living probate scheme• to reach 
the American statute books in this century; another has been 
pending in the Ohio legislature,2 and the draftsmen of the Uni-
form Probate Code have begun work on a Uniform Ante-Mortem 
Probate Act.3 Living probate is addressed to the predicament of 
a testator who fears that after his death his estate may be sub-
jected to a will contest in which it will be alleged that he lacked 
the mental capacity to execute his will. The recent legislation and 
draft legislation would permit the testator to bring suit against 
potential contestants in order to obtain an adjudication regarding 
his capacity while he is alive and best able to inform the determi-
nation. 
The main purpose of the present Article is to suggest a some-
what different theoretical and practical approach to structuring 
the living probate procedure. I shall characterize the procedure 
called for in the North Dakota act and in similar proposals as the 
Contest Model of living probate, in distinction to a Conservator-
ship Model that I shall advocate to be the better way. Part I of 
this Article reviews briefly the problem to which living probate 
is addressed and the alternatives that can presently be employed 
to forestall post-mortem capacity litigation in the absence of a 
living probate system. In Part TI the Contest Model is examined 
and certain of its shortcomings are identified. Part ill shows why 
• Professor of Law, The University of ·Chicago. A.B. 1964, Columbia University; 
LL.B. 1968, Harvard University; LL.B. 1969, Ph.D. 1971, Cambridge University.-Ed. 
t References and suggestions from David Currie (Chicago), Allison Dunham (Chi-
cago), Howard Fink (Ohio State), William Francisco (St. Mary's, San Antonio), Philip 
Kurland (Chicago), Irwin L. Langbein, Esq., Lawrence Waggoner (Michigan), and Rich-
ard Wellman (Georgia), and the diligent research assistance of John Mangum (Chicago 
'80) are gratefully acknowledged. In many places this Article has drawn upon the knowl-
edge of my late colleague Max Rheinstein, with whom I had the good fortune to discuss 
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a procedure modelled upon the existing principles and procedures 
for determining-the capacity of the living in the conservatorship 
context commends itself as the superior design for living probate 
legislation. 
Living probate is a fitting subject to discuss in the Michigan 
Law Review in a Festschrift for George Palmer. Living probate 
was first attempted in Michigan' in the nineteenth century, but 
it was done badly and miscarried5 for want of the sort of careful 
forethought and design that has in the twentieth century charac-
terized the series of national probate-reform projects that have 
emanated from the University of Michigan Law School. The re-
vival of living probate in the present day has been possible only 
because of the persistent refusal of American legal scholars to 
allow the underlying problem to go unsolved. 8 Concern with mat-
ters of procedure and remedy is one of the greatest strengths of 
American legal scholarship, and over the last generation George 
Palmer has been the largest figure working in the tradition of 
remedy law in the field of trusts and estates. 
I. THE NEED FOR LIVING PROBATE 
A. Capacity Litigation 
Discussion of living probate must begin with the problem of 
the will contest alleging testamentary incapacity. Although we do 
not have comparative data directly on point,7 the impression is 
widespread that such litigation occurs more frequently in the 
United States than on the Continent or in England. We may 
point to several factors that bear upon the differential: 
(1) In civil law countries, children as well as the spouse 
have a forced share entitlement in the estate of a parent. The 
4. Act of Apr. 11, 1883, 1883 Mich. Pub. Acts 17, reprinted in R. WELLMAN, L. WAG· 
GONER, & 0. BROWDER, PALMER'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION 117 n,3 
(3d ed. 1978); Fink, Ante-Mortem Probate Revisited: Can an Idea Have a Life After 
Death?, 37 Omo ST. L.J. 264, 268 n.8 (1976); 33 AM. L. REG, (o.e,) 794 (1885). 
5. See Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 56 Mich. 236, 23 N.W. 28 (1885). 
6. Cavers, Ante Mortem Probate: An Essay in Preventive Law, 1 U. Cm. L. REV. 440 
(1934), has had an enduring influence. The article by Professor Howard P. Fink, supra 
note 4, has been especially important in provoking the latest legislative action. The recent 
Commissioners' draft, supra note 3, is based substantially upon drafts done in the 1960s 
by Professors Eugene F. Scoles and Allan D. Vestal during work on the Uniform Probate 
Code, and on a draft uniform act prepared in 1932. UNIFORM Acr To ESTABLISH W~ 
BEFORE DEATH OF TESTATOR (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1932), in HANDBOOK OF THE NATL. CoNF. 
OF COMMRS. ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SECOND ANNUAL 
CoNFERENCE 463 (1932). 
7. For crude and outdated figures from New York, see Cahn, Undue Influence and 
Captation: A Comparative Study, 8 TuL. L. REV. 507, 618 & n.68 (1934). 
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disinherited child, who is the typical plaintiff in American testa-
mentary capacity litigation, is unknown to European law.8 The 
European parent can leave his heir disgruntled with the statutory 
minimum, but that share will often be large enough by compari-
son with the potential winnings from litigation to deaden the 
incentive to contest. . 
(2) Many American jurisdictions permit will contests on 
the question of capacity to be tried to a jury, 9 which may be more 
disposed to work equity for the disinherited than to obey the 
directions· of an eccentric decedent who is in any event beyond 
suffering. Civil jury trial has disappeared from English estate 
law; it was never known on the Continent. · 
(3) American law is unique among Western civil procedural 
systems in failing to charge a losing plaintiff with the attorney 
fees and other costs incurred by the defendant in the course of 
resisting the plaintiff's unjustified claim.10 In testamentary ca-
pacity litigation the American rule has the effect of requiring 
decedents' estates to subsidize the depredations of contestants. 
Put differently, the American rule diminishes the magnitude of 
a contestant's potential loss, which diminishes his disincentive to 
litigate an improbable claim. 
(4) Civil law systems provide for the so-called authenti-
cated will, which is executed before a quasi-judicial officer called 
the notary .11 This is not the only means of making a valid will in 
European countries, and because it is costly it is not widely used. 
But the notarial procedure does permit a testator who fears a 
post-mortem contest to generate during his lifetime and have 
preserved with the will evidence of exceptional quality regarding, 
inter alia, his capacity. The notary before whom the testator exe-
cutes his will is not a judge; he does not adjudicate capacity. But 
he is a legally qualified and experienced officer of the state who 
is obliged to satisfy himself of the testator's capacity as a precon-
dition for receiving or transcribing the testament.12 The authenti-
8. See, e.g., for Germany, T. KIPP & H. CoING, ERBRECHT 52-105 (13th ed. 1978). See 
also Cahn, supra note 7, at 521, concluding: "The elaborate growth of the doctrine of 
undue influence at common law may be attributed to the lack of [a forced heirship] 
system and to a desire to palliate certain resultant hardships." 
9. See generally Annot., Right to Jury in a Will Contest, 62 A.L.R. 82 (1929); 3 W. 
BoWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAw OF WILLS§ 26.85 (1961). 
10. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4 & n.4 (1973), and literature cited therein. 
11. See M. RHEINSTEIN & M. GLENDON, THE LAW OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES 198-99 
(1971). See generally Brown, The Office of the Notary in France, 2 lNTL. & COMP. L.Q. 60 
(1953). 
12. M. RHEINSTEIN & M. GLENDON, supra note 11, at 198. For Germany, see T. KIPP 
& H. CoING, supra note 8, at 200; 1 U. VON LUB'I'Ow, ERBRECHT 194-95 (1971). For Italy, 
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cated will is, therefore, extremely difficult for contestants to set 
aside for want of capacity in post-mortem proceedings. (This civil 
law notarial practice was the inspiration for certain so-called liv-
ing probate proposals in the United States in the 1930s, which we 
shall discuss and distinguish shortly.) 13 
A major reason that the impact of capacity litigation in 
America is so difficult to measure is that most of it is directed 
towards provoking pretrial settlements, typically for a fraction of 
what the contestants would be entitled to receive if they were to 
defeat the will. Especially when such tactics succeed, they do not 
leave traces in the law reports. Thus, the odor of the s~rike suit 
hangs heavily over this field. 14 The beneficiaries named in the will 
are likely to be either charitable organizations whom the testator 
preferred to his relatives, or else those of his relatives and friends 
whom he loved most and who are most likely to want to spare his 
reputation from a capacity suit. They are typically put to the 
choice of defending a lawsuit in which a skilled plaintiffs lawyer 
will present evidence to a jury at a public trial touching every 
eccentricity that might cast doubt upon the testator's condition, 
or compromising the suit, thereby overriding the disposition de-
sired by the testator and rewarding the contestants for threaten-
ing to besmirch his name. 
On the other hand, this is not an invariable scenario. No one 
seems to believe that the substantive law of testamentary capac-
ity is misguided and should be repealed. There is a consensus that 
madmen should not be writing wills, and that enfeebled testators 
should not be allowed to be victimized by domineering nurses, 
counselors, or whomever. Yet there is little hope that doctrinal 
refinement in the law of capacity could enable the courts to do a 
better job of separating meritorious from unfounded capacity 
contests. The genre is inevitably intensely factitious: the recur-
rent issue is the condition of the particular testator as the trier 
can infer it from evidence of his past conduct and circumstances. 
The attraction of a living probate system is that it promises 
to yield better results from the same body of substantive law, by 
improving the procedure and the evidence used to determine the 
see G. BARTOLINI, MANuALE DEL NorAJO 67 (6th ed. 1957). 
13. See text at notes 23-31 infra. 
14. "Contestants have nothing to lose-the 'nuisance value' of delay and the abhor-
rence of respectable persons for publicity may result in a settlement." Cahn, supra note 
7, at 518. Beyond the "deepseated suspicion of contestants' bona /ides" that Cahn refers 
to, id., nothing much is known or knowable about the actual dimensions of the strike-suit 
phenomenon, since neither the winners nor the losers have any particular incentive to 
leave traces of it. ' 
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question of capacity. The basic insight is that since the substan-
tive question is capacity as of the time of execution of the testa-
ment, execution would be the ideal time to determine capacity. 
The longer adjudication of any question is postponed, the more 
likely it is that the quality of the evidence available to the trier 
will deteriorate. In the field of testamentary capacity, that proba-
bility is a certainty: post-mortem adjudication of capacity insures 
by definition that the best evidence of capacity-the testator 
himself-will be placed beyond the reach of the court. However 
novel the concept of living probate, it responds to purposes that 
have long been emphasized at common law in the best evidence 
rule. What has kept living probate from the statute books has 
been the concern that in attempting to resolve the capacity ques-
tion during the lifetime of the testator, other problems of proce-
dure and judicial economy would arise that might outweigh the 
gain. These are matters to which we shall turn in Part II of this 
Article. 
Operating without living probate, the American estate-
planning bar has had to devise some techniques for protecting 
against the danger of capacity contests. One factor-although 
hardly the predominant one-in the explosive growth in the use 
of will substitutes, especially the revocable inter vivos trust, is 
that they are more resistant to capacity challenges ( even though, 
paradoxically, the substantive standard of capacity is higher for 
inter vivos than for testamentary transfers) .15 Trusts belong to the 
jury-free realm of equity law; and the settlor who lives with his 
trust for a while, conveying property to it and receiving income 
distributions, has the opportunity to show greater deliberateness 
than someone who merely signs a will that works no lifetime 
consequences upon him. The will substitutes also involve the 
settlor with intermediaries such as bank or trust company officers 
who have acted in reliance upon his seeming capacity in the 
ordinary course of their business and whose testimony will 
usually be available to support his capacity in the event of chal-
lenge. 
In a case in which there is a particular risk of post-mortem 
capacity contest-where, for example, an elderly testator of sub-
stantial means and peculiar habits wishes to disinherit his rela-
tives in favor of a charity or a friend18-the main reliance of the 
estate planning bar is on the afforced execution ceremony, whose 
15. See text at notes· 61-65 infra. 
16. See the example given in W. LEACH, CASES AND TExT ON THE LAw OF WILU! 46 (2d 
ed. 1960). 
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object is to generate and preserve superior evidence of capacity. 
The testator is expressly cautioned about the seriousness and the 
irregularity of the projected disinheritance and asked to explain 
it either before17 or at18 the execution ceremony. These proceed-
ings may be videotaped, 19 or a stenographer may attend to tran-
scribe them. Witnesses well above the statutory minimum (in-
cluding both strangers and longtime professional acquaintances 
such as the family physician and priest) may be asked to attend 
the execution and to observe the testator's condition and state-
ment of purposes. Psychiatrists may sometimes be employed in 
these proceedings. 20 If a stenographer has attended, the resulting 
transcript may be circulated to the witnesses for verification and 
attestation. 21 
Such precautions achieve a result somewhat similar to the 
authenticated will of civil law practice. Although no public offi-
cial such as the Continental notary is employed, highly persua-
sive evidence of capacity is secured. The object is to enable the 
estate to discourage post-mortem contests without litigation, 
merely by disclosing to potential challengers the precautions that 
were taken; or if litigation ensues, to enhance the position of the 
proponents of the will, preferably enabling them to avoid jury 
trial by winning at the summary judgment stage. Nevertheless, 
precaution is not adjudication, and summary judgment may be 
hard to obtain if the testator left significant evidence of feebleness 
or eccentricity. Without summary judgment, the estate must run 
the risk and expense of trial, usually jury trial. The contestants 
in an undue influence suit can argue that the precautions taken 
were themselves symptomatic of the overreaching being com-
plained of, and even in an ordinary ("unsound mind") capacity 
challenge, the argument can be made that what the precautions 
really show is that the people who were counselling the testator 
had doubts about his capacity. The afforced execution ceremony 
is, therefore, not a wholly adequate solution to the underlying 
problem. It is a splendid, lawyerly stopgap, but it can only imper-
fectly occupy the procedural void left by the want of an effective 
living probate system.22 
17. Jaworski, The Will Contest, 10 BAYLOR L. REv. 87, 92 (1958). 
18. W. LEACH, supra note 16, at 47. 
19. On evidentiary admissibility of videotape in court proceedings, see generally 
Annot., 66 A.L.R.3d 637 (1975), and sources cited therein. 
20. But see Jaworski, supra note 17, at 93. 
21. W. LEACH, supra note 16, at 47. 
22. There are a couple of other devices in current practice that may help deter will 
contests. An in terrorem clause can be inserted, typically disallowing benefits under the 
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B. What Living Probate Is Not 
Because a good deal of the thinking about living probate that 
went on in the United States in the 1930s had the Continental 
authenticated will in mind, the label "living probate" was used 
to describe some features of notarial will practice that have no 
necessary connection with the business of establishing testamen-
tary capacity, but which also commend themselves as desirable 
reforms for American probate procedure. Before turning to con-
sider the design of the living probate system, it will be convenient 
to distinguish these other matters from true living probate. 
(1) A main function of the notary in the European legal 
systems is to provide for official safekeeping of notarized docu-
ments. Notarial deposit of a will serves (in combination with 
relatively strict rules for revoking such wills} to discourage the 
testator from ineffective attempts at altering or revoking the will, 
and it prevents accidental destruction, unauthorized tampering, 
or outright forgery from occurring subsequent to the authenti-
cated execution. Writers of the 1930s called for equivalent Ameri-
can arrangements, 23 and the Uniform Probate Code and a variety 
of individual states have now made provision for courthouse de-
pository schemes.24 
will to anyone who contests it; however, such a provision cannot influence a contestant 
. who is left nothing under the will, but who would take if it were invalidated. Furthermore, 
many jurisdictions limit the enforcement of such clauses; see, e.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
§ 3-905. 
There are ways of preserving testimony about capacity, but without adjudication 
these self-serving declarations by the testator and his friends work no particular improve-
ment on the afforced execution ceremony. E.g., UNIFORM PERPETUATION OF TEBTIMoNY ACT; 
N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 2507(1) (McKinney 1967), noted in E. CLARK, L. LUSKEY, 
& A. MURPHY, GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS 227 (2d ed. 1977). There was a Chancery procedure, 
sometimes called de bene esse procedure, for perpetuating testimony, and Blackstone 
treats the anticipated will contest as its characteristic sphere: 
H witnesses to a disputable fact are old and infirm, it is very usual to file a 
bill to perpetuate the testimony of those witnesses, although no suit is depending; 
for, it may be, a man's antagonist only waits for the death of some of them to begin 
his suit. This is most frequent when lands are devised by will away from the heir 
at law, and the devisee, in order to perpetuate the testimony of the witnesses to 
such will, exhibits a bill in Chancery against the heir, and sets forth the will 
verbatim therein, suggesting that the heir is inclined to dispute its validity; and 
then, the defendant having answered, they proceed to issue as in other cases, and 
examine the witnesses to the will; after which the cause is at an end without 
proceeding to any decree, no relief being prayed by the bill; but the heir is entitled 
to his costs, even though he contests the will. This is what is usually meant by 
proving a will in Chancery. 
3 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND *450 (1768). 
23. E.g., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON REv!SION OF THE LAws OF NORTH CAROLINA 
RELATING TO ESTATES 8, 17-18, 77-81 (1939); Kutscher, Living Probate, 21 A.B.A.J. 427 
(1935). 
24. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE§§ 2-901 to 902 & Comments. 
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(2) The Continental notary-who is, I reiterate, a fully 
qualified lawyer and sworn officer of the state-is obliged when 
conducting the procedure for authenticated testation to satisfy 
himself of the identity of the testator and to oversee the testator's 
compliance with the formalities. European law attaches to the 
authenticated will an extremely strong (although nominally re-
buttable) presumption of validity, on the very reasonable suppo-
sition that this expert in legal paperwork will have taken his 
statutory responsibilities seriously. The most important effect of 
this presumption is in those cases (the vast preponderance) in 
which there is no contest and in which no question of rebutting 
the presumption arises. In these cases the authenticated will is 
treated as "self-proving," in the sense that it is given effect in 
post-mortem affairs without the need of judicial proceedings to 
establish its genuineness and formal validity.25 
American reformers, embarrassed or annoyed by the costly 
and pointless rote of summoning attesting witnesses or handwrit-
ing experts for mandatory judicial proceedings convened to •pro-
bate uncontested wills, looked longingly at the self-proving fea-
ture of the authenticated will. Eventually, Texas28 and then the 
Uniform Probate Code27 jurisdictions enacted a common law ver-
sion, whose simple expedient is to extend a somewhat similar 
presumption of validity to any will which contains an attestation 
clause of sufficient particularity and which is executed before an 
American notary: Because our notary is such a frail imitation of 
his European counterpart, 28 our draftsmen have been careful to 
limit the effect of notarization to the technicalities of Wills Act 
formal compliance. Section 3-406 of the Uniform Probate Code 
allows the self-proving will to effect a conclusive presumption of 
mechanical compliance with the signature requirements for the 
testator and the attesting witnesses, but contestants' right to 
prove fraud or forgery is expressly reserved. The Official Com-
ment to section 3-406 also makes clear that "proof of undue influ-
ence [or] lack of testamentary capacity" is not precluded.29 The 
self-proving will is not living probate. 
(3) The Continental authenticated will is virtually immune 
25. Louisiana has long made similar provision for its notarial (called "nuncupative") 
will. "Nuncupative testaments received by public acts do not require to be proved • • • ; 
they are full proof of themselves, unless they are alleged to be forged." LA. C1v. CODE ANN. 
art. 1647 (West 1952). 
26. TEx. Pru>B. CODE ANN.§ 59 (Vernon 1956). 
27. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-504. 
28. See text at note 11 supra. 
29. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-406 Comment. 
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from attack on asserted grounds of Wills Act noncompliance. The 
notary has supervised the execution, and the notarial presump-
tion of validity sheathes the will. Observers in the common law 
world have occasionally suggested30 that some version of notarial 
testation, perhaps mandatory, might be devised in our legal sys-
tem in order to prevent laymen from attempting those home-
drawn wills that so frequently fail on account of pathetic viola- · 
tions of the Wills Act formal requirements. For present purposes 
it should suffice to say that grave objections can be advanced 
against mandatory notarial testation, 31 and that in any event the 
topic would once again lead us away from the proper sphere of 
living probate. Living ·probate is not meant as a remedy for the 
problem of the home-drawn will. In wills that fail for formal de-
fects, questions of capacity need never be reached. Living pro-
bate, which contemplates ante-mortem judicial proceedings, con-
cerns the lawyer-served end of the estate planning spectrum 
where compliance with the Wills Act forms is routinely achieved. 
Sometimes in discussion of living probate a rather opposite 
point is suggested: since living probate is not the answer to the 
intractable problems of mass testation, and since only a relative 
handful of testators would have occasion to make use of it, living 
probate is a frill that the legal system can do without. The an-
swer, of course, is that many established legal procedures and 
remedies are seldom used; the temporary restraining order and 
the equitable tracing decree, for example, are scarcely common-
30. JUSTICE (British Section of the International Commission of Jurists), HoME-MADE 
WILLS 1, 4-6, 8 (1971). Redfearn, Ante-Mortem Probate, 38 COM. L.J. 571 (1933), thought 
that living probate was a good cure for execution defects, but did not propose making the 
procedure mandatory. 
31. The Justice proposal for compulsory notarial testation, supra note 30, would 
extend notarial procedure far beyond the European systems, where the notarial will is an 
optional and relatively seldom used mode of testation. Since the common law world 
scarcely knows a proper notary, the Justice proposal finds it "advisable to have, attached 
to the staff of each registry or subregistry of births, marriages and deaths one or more 
officials ('Wills Officers') who would be qualified to act as witnesses of wills." Id. at 5. 
This is, of course, the standard English nostrum of recent decades: paternalistic bureau-
cratization and socialization, without regard to the alternatives and the costs. Thi! pro-
posal is also self-defeating, since it would require the invalidation of wills not made in 
accordance with the awkward but mandatory procedure. 
There are some less drastic steps that can be taken to reduce the incidence of home-
drawn wills that fail for violation of the Wills Act formal requirements. The Uniform 
Probate Code has tried to reduce the number and complexity of formalities, so laymen 
would have less to get wrong .. See UNIFORM PRoBATE CODE art. II, pt. 5, General Comment; 
and§§ 2-502 to 503 & Comments. I have elsewhere urged that the proponents of a defec-
tively executed will should be allowed to prove that the defect was harmless to the pur-
poses of the Wills Act. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARv. 
L. REv. 489 (1975). 
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place. So long as the extortionate capacity contest constitutes a 
real threat to the estate planning of the elderly, the inclination 
should be to provide the procedural device needed to forestall it. 
If living probate is to be fairly resisted, it must be on the ground 
that the gain is not worth the cost. Having reached considerations 
of cost, I now tum to discuss the actual design and operation of 
living probate procedure. 
II. THE CONTEST MODEL 
The crux of the problem we have been discussing is that the 
post-mortem format in which the capacity contest is now fought 
seriously disadvantages the proponents of the will by requiring 
that the testator whose condition is the issue be unavailable be-
fore the contest can be aired. The natural instinct of a legislative 
draftsman contemplating this predicament is to devise a proce-
dure that moves the contest forward into the lifetime of the testa-
tor. 
Both the Michigan statute of 1883 and the North Dakota 
statute of 1977 took this approach to living probate. They author-
ized the testator to sue to establish his capacity to execute the 
particular will against defendants comprising those persons who 
would be his heirs if he were to die at the moment of the suit. (I 
shall hereafter call these people the "heirs apparent. "32) The 
Michigan statute, which was declared in violation of the state 
constitution on its first attempted use, 33 foundered on account of 
a variety of defects that a modem draftsman would not repeat.34 
The North Dakota statute, written against the background of the 
extensive twentieth-century experience with the declaratory 
judgment mechanism, is the better example. It allows the testa-
tor to "institute a proceeding . . . for a judgment declaring the 
[formal] validity of the will . . . and the testamentary capacity 
and freedom from undue influence of the person executing the 
will."as 
This legislation does indeed respond to the need of the propo-
nents of the will. The ante-mortem will contest permits a funda-
mental enrichment of the proofs. The testator whose condition is 
in issue can appear in court for the trier to observe and to exam-
32. Other labels are known: "heirs expectant," "heirs presumptive." The North Da-
kota statute describes these people as "all the testator's present intestate successors," 
N.D. CENT, CODE§ 30.1;08.1-02 (Supp. 1977). 
33. Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 56 Mich. 236, 23 N.W. 28 (1885). 
34. See Fink, supra note 4, at 268-74. 
35. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-01 (Supp. 1977). 
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ine. He becomes available for medical examination, and he will 
have the opportunity to guide cross-examination and rebuttal of 
opposing witnesses. The attraction of this solution is manifest. It 
appears at once simple and apt. Since the problem is one of 
timing-undue postponement of the contest-the remedy is to 
accelerate the contest into the testator's lifetime. 
Unfortunately, a series of closely interconnected changes 
other than this one of timing also take place when living probate 
takes this form of an accelerated will contest. 
(1) To speak of accelerating the contest is to assume that 
the testator's fear would necessarily materialize, that the contest 
will be brought against his estate post-mortem if he is not allowed 
to bring it ante-mortem. But, of course, that will not always be 
true. Any anticipatory remedy scheme involves some overpredic-
tion among the user class. 
If a testator mistakenly foresees a will contest that would not 
have been brought, the heirs apparent can simply concede or 
default; little harm is done, and the testator obtains the decree 
he wants for his own peace of mind. But there are situations in 
which the heirs apparent would contest as defendants a will that 
they would not have contested as objectors to probate: the testa-
tor's suit may be an irreparable blow to family harmony; and 
persons who would have been loath to start trouble may then 
decide to finish it; the estate may be worth more in the prospect 
than in the leaving, on account of consumption or devaluation in 
the interval between testation and succession; the contumacious 
among the heirs apparent may predecease the testator; and so 
forth. In these cases the overprediction· incident to the ante-
mortem contest format will increase the total stock of will con-
tests, and that must be reckoned as a social cost. The courts must 
process the extra caseload, and under the American system of 
minimal recovery of court costs from the litigants, the taxpayers 
will subsidize it. Furthermore, because litigation is such an un-
pleasant activity for the parties, especially litigation as ugly as a 
family fight over the question of whether one of the members is 
demented, there are nonfinancial reasons for treating an extra 
increment of such litigation as imposing a worrisome social cost. 
(2) Under the Contest Model of living probate the parties 
are reversed. Those who deny the testator's capacity-the plain-
tiffs in conventional capacity contests-are made defendants in 
the ante-mortem suit. This transposition might have implica-
tions adverse to the testator for the allocation of the burden of 
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proof, 36 but otherwise it works to the detriment of the persons 
made defendants. The Contest Model requires the heirs apparent 
to make the decision to litigate earlier than it is in their interest 
to do so, quite apart from the evidentiary advantage that they 
have in post-mortem contests as a result of the testator's enforced 
silence and which living probate is designed to overcome. 
To take an example already alluded to, the heirs apparent 
who successfully defend a living probate suit must still wait for 
the testator's death before a.."ly of them can acquire a beneficial 
interest in his property. Decades can separate victory from suc-
cession, during which time the property can diminish in value for 
a variety of reasons. Depending upon the relative ages and afflu-
ence of the parties, the difficulty of the proofs, and the other 
factors that bear on the risk preferences of the heirs apparent, the 
financial investment necessary to defend such a lawsuit may ap-
pear quite unwise, even though the testator be quite mad. 
Perhaps the most striking difficulty that inheres in conceiv-
ing of living probate as a lawsuit between the testator and his 
heirs is expressed in a fundamental maxim of property law: nemo 
est haeres viventis, commonly rendered as "the living have no 
heirs."37 Heirship arises at the moment of the ancestor's death. 
Those of his heirs apparent who predecease him do not become 
his heirs-at-law; while the ancestor lives, there is a possibility 
that persons yet unborn may be among his ultimate heirs; and 
persons such as the children of a living child who have been born 
but are not among the heirs apparent may eventually become 
heirs if their parent predeceases the testator. 
The North Dakota statute deals with this problem by fiat: 
the heirs apparent are "deemed possessed of inchoate property 
rights."38 This legislative patent may suffice to create standing 
and interest for purposes of the jurisdiction's case-and-con-
troversy requirement, but it does not face up to the underlying 
dilemma of the heirs apparent. Those named as contestants may 
not survive to be beneficiaries even if they fight and win (at their 
own expense); the ultimate heirs may include persons who are not 
heirs apparent but who will be bound by litigation to which they 
were not parties;39 and the defendants are exposed to the range 
36. In some, but not all, jurisdictions, a presumption of sanity shifts the burden of 
proof to the contestants. See 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2500, at 356-58 (3d ed. 1940). In 
living probate, however, the presumption of sanity from due execution should not pertain; 
the proceeding is irregular and the burden of proof should, as usual, follow allegation. 
37. Literally, "no one is the heir of the living." 
38. N.D. CENT. CooE § 30.1-08.1-02 (Supp. 1977). 
39. Professor Fink argues that "the interests of remote and possibly unborn takers 
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of litigation management difficulties usually associated with a 
(plaintiffs) class action, especially the free rider problem, which 
comes about because of th~ absence of any provision for the active 
litigants to enforce contribution from others who may benefit 
from the litigation. 
The largest failing of the North Dakota scheme is not intrin-
sic to the Contest Model of living probate and could have been 
avoided. We have seen how the difficulties incident to possible 
fluctuations among the heirs apparent and in the estate are mag-
nified by the necessity of allocating and paying defensive litiga-
tion costs at a time potentially so far in advance of actual pro-
bate. It is a serious mistake of legislative policy to permit the 
testator to inflict upon his heirs apparent the choice between 
defaulting or bearing these accelerated costs. Living probate is a 
testator's option, provided for the testator's benefit, and it should 
proceed at the testator's expense. Any living probate scheme, 
but especially one like the North Dakota statute that is fashioned 
in the Contest Model, is unfair if it does not require the testator 
to defray the reasonable costs of opposing his claim. 
No reform, however, can cure the basic shortcoming of the 
Contest Model, which is the inherent want of defensive ripeness. 
The testator needs to have his capacity adjudicated before it is 
squarely in the interest of his heirs to challenge it. The conven-
tional adversarial format of the will contest agai:q.st the testator's 
heirs cannot really be adapted to solve this problem. 
ill. THE CONSERVATORSHIP MODEL 
The thesis of the present Article is that a reconceptualization 
of the underlying cause of action along the lines of the existing 
procedure that is used to determine the capacity of the living with 
respect to their property in protective proceedings would elimi-
nate the defects that have characterized the Contest Model of 
living probate. 
Every Anglo-American legal system has a court which takes 
jurisdiction over the affairs of persons who become unable to care 
for themselves or their property. In England it is aptly called the 
Court of Protection. In the United States this jurisdiction is com-
... would usually coincide with the interests pressed by present takers [i.e., by the heirs 
apparent!; thus the doctrine of 'virtual representation' would ordinarily protect [sic; 
estop?I future takers." Fink, supra note 4, at 275-76. Thus, for example, Fink would allow 
a child who lacked the heart to resist his parent's living probate suit to bind his own 
chidren, the testator's grandchildren, by his default, even if the child thereafter prede-
ceased the testator, leaving the grandchildren as the testator's actual heirs. 
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monly attached to the probate court or to the probate division of 
the court of general jurisdiction. Although this protective juris-
diction and its basic principles of procedure are ancient, there is 
wide diversity on matters of terminology and practical detail. For 
simplicity's sake I shall base the present discussion upon the 
fairly widely adopted40 model of the Uniform Probate Code 
(UPC). The UPC exemplifies the modern tendency to call pro-
ceedings to protect the property of an adult "conservatorship" 
and to restrict the term "guardianship" to the supervision of the 
person's nonproprietary affairs.41 In many states, however, the 
term "guardianship of the property" is still used for what we shall 
be describing as conservatorship. Nothing of importance turns on 
the terminology; what is hereafter called the Conservatorship 
Model of living probate might easily have been called the Guardi-
anship Model. 
Protective proceedings may be involuntary, in the sense that 
they are instituted on the motion of someone other than the per-
son to be protected and are resisted by him; or voluntary, in 
which instance the person to be protected himself requests the 
creation of the protective regime.42 The analogue to living probate 
is, of course, the latter. Under the UPC procedure, the person to 
be protected must be represented by counsel, and the court is 
empowered to have him examined by a ·court-appointed physi-
cian. 43 There is provision for notice and right of appearance for 
relatives and others "who would be adversely affected" by mis-
management of his affairs. 44 If the court determines, after hear-
ing, that the person is sufficiently disabled that his affairs require 
conservatorship, the cotµt may (either directly or through an ap-
pointed conservator) exercise "all the powers over his estate and 
affairs which he could exercise" if he were able. 45 Powers to enter 
into or to alter a variety of gratuitous transfers commonly re-
garded as will substitutes are expressly included, but the power 
to make a will is expressly excluded.48 (This exclusion, which 
makes perfectly good sense in a pure conservatorship scheme, is 
discussed in Subsection B below).47 
40. Regarding state adoption of the Uniform Probate Code, see 8 UNIFORM LAws ANN, 
83 (Supp. 1979). 
41. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 1-201(6), -201(16), 5-101, -312, -401(2), -409. 
42. UNIFORM PROBATE CoDE §§ 5-404 to 407. 
43. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE§ 5-407. 
44. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE§§ 5-404(a), -405. 
45. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE§ 5-408(3). 
46. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE§ 5-408(3). 
47. See text at note 66 infra. 
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A. The Procedure in Outline 
The suggestion now to be developed is that this c·onservator-
ship procedure lends itself-to imitation for the design of a living 
probate system. We are adapting a long-established procedure for 
determining the competence of the living that has been con-
structed with due regard for the interests of the person whose 
property is at stake, his relatives, and others. We may sketch the 
main features of Conservatorship Model living probate as follows: 
1. Initiation 
The testator would petition the court that now makes capac-
ity determinations in conservatorship and guardianship cases for 
a declaration that he possesses capacity to execute a particular 
will, and he would attach the will in executed form to his peti-
tion.48 Attaching the will involves publicity and.thus the sacrifice 
of the privacy that is such a desirable incident to ordinary will-
making, but the sacrifice is essential. The standard of the sub-
stantive law is testamentary capacity not in the abstract, but in 
the context of the particular testamentary disposition. That dis-
position is disclosed to the trier in post-mortem capacity litiga-
tion, 49 and it would have to be in ante-mortem proceedings as 
well.50 
48. I see no reason for in-court execution of the will. Sine~ counsel will be obligatory, 
see text at note 51 infra, he can supervise out-of-court execution. Having the will executed 
in advance of the living probate proceeding protects against the testator dying with the 
will unexecuted before the lawsuit comes to adjudication. A contestant might attempt to 
argue in subsequent post-mortem proceedings that the testator was in fact incapable when 
he executed the will, which is the time as of which capacity is relevant, and that he secured 
his living probate immunization during a legally irrelevant subsequent "lucid interval." 
Although such a contest should be easily defeated, an estate planner who wanted to 
forestall it could have the testator re-execute the will on the date and hour of adjudication. 
49. For a stimulating argument against this practice, see Comment, A Case Against 
Admitting into Evidence the Dispositive Elements of a Will in a Contest Based on Testa-
mentary Incapacity, 2 CONN. L. REV. 616 (1970). 
50. Reacting to a prepublication draft of this Article, Professor Gregory Alexander of 
the University of Georgia Law School has prepared a paper pointing out that the will could 
be kept secret if the living probate decree were made nonbinding. Alexander, The Con-
servatorship Model: A Modification, 77 MrcH. L. REv. 86 (1978). In evaluating this sug-
gestion, readers should bear in mind that the testator who values ant,e-mortem secrecy 
over post-mortem collateral estoppel already has available the devices described in the 
text at notes 16-22 supra. I find it hard to imagine that there would be much potential 
demand among testators for a via media between those procedures and true living probate 
that imports collateral estoppel, although I see no particular harm in a legislative drafts-
man providing such an option. 
In the post-mortem contest that Alexander's procedure would permit, counsel for the 
average contestant would find it child's play to identify fact issues (especially of the undue 
influence variety) beyond the scope of the former inquiry in the ex parte proceeding, 
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As in voluntary conservatorship proceedings, 01 the petition-
ing testator should be obliged to-be represented by counsel. The 
requirement of representation should assure adequate prelimi-
nary counselling of the testator and proper drafting and execution 
of the will; it would also protect against any frivolous use of the 
procedure by a perverse or entertainment-seeking testator.G2 
2. Parties; Guardian Ad Litem 
The liberal provision for notice and right of appearance in 
existing conservatorship practice should be carried over to Con-
servatorship Model living probate. The heirs apparent, the 
beneficiaries named in the will that is the subject of the pro-
ceeding, and the beneficiaries named in any former will or wills 
that might be revoked or amended under the new one should 
have the right to notice53 and appearance. 
The guardian ad litem is a familiar figure of protective juris-
diction. In a Conservatorship Model living probate scheme this 
device can be adapted to overcome the defensive disadvantage of 
the heirs apparent, which is, as we have seen, the great problem 
of Contest Model living probate. The appointment of aG4 guardian 
ad litem should be mandatory. He would represent all persons 
whose ultimate property interests might be adversely affected by 
a mistaken determination that the testator possessed capacity to 
execute the will. That is to say, he would represent the heirs 
apparent, all potential heirs unborn or unascertained at the time, 
and persons whose potential interests under any previous will or 
wills still in force might be impaired under the new will. The heirs 
apparent would, therefore, have the attractive choice of declining 
to contest the testator's suit in their own names, while still being 
represented by the guardian ad Iitem. They would be able to 
communicate any relevant information or suspicions to the 
guardian ad litem in confidence, without having to take actions 
overtly hostile to the testator. (If this procedure is to serve its 
thereby resisting summary judgment and restoring his strike suit to its full nuisance value. 
I fear that Alexander's suggestion tracks Continental notarial will procedure too closely 
to be an adequate remedy against the seamy abuses so characteristic of adversary proce-
dure in American will contests. The estate planning bar would understand this, and the 
optional nonbinding living probate procedure would only clutter the statute book, 
51. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-407(c). 
52. For other deterrents to overuse, see the discussion of costs in text at notes 55-56 
infra and text at note 39 supra. 
53. See UNIFORM PROBATE CoDE §§ 5-405, 1-401; Fink, supra note 4, at 284-86. 
54. Or more than one if in a particular situation there were a significant conflict of 
interest among these people respecting the capacity determination. 
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purpose, the requirement of notice to the ·heirs apparent and to 
the beneficiaries under any prior will or wills thought to be af-
fected by the new will is e~sential.) The guardian ad litem would 
not necessarily have to wage bitter contest in such a case, no 
matter how sane the testator appeared, but he would be obliged 
to put the testator to fair proof. Subject to court supervision, the 
guardian would have powers of discovery, including the right to 
have documents produced and to take depositions in matters 
bearing on possible undue influence. 
The guardian ad litem device in Conservatorship Model liv-
ing probate has two distinct advantages over the will-contest-
against-the-heirs format discussed in Part II of this Article. It 
would permit full development and ventilation of evidence of 
incapacity without requiring family members to step forward and 
assert that the testator lacked capacity. Those positions adverse 
to the testator would be developed,· but not in the exaggerated 
mold of adversary contest, which has such unpleasant implica-
tions for· family harmony and for the human values at stake. 
Second, in combination with the cost-shifting provision men-
tioned next, the guardian ad litem device cures the defensive 
awkwardness that bedevils the Contest Model of living probate. 
The heirs unborn or unascertained would be represented, as 
would those of the heirs apparent who, under Contest Model pro-
cedure, would have to calculate that their chances of profiting 
were too remote t.o justify litigating. 
3. Costs 
For the reasons developed at the conclusion of Part II, 55 jus-
tice requires that the testator be required to pay the reasonable 
costs of the guardian ad litem. This cost-shifting would also con-
stitute an appropriate disincentive to inconsiderate use of the 
living probate system. 
The concern is sometimes voiced in discussions of living pro-
bate that testators would use the procedure to excess. Similar 
reservations were expressed earlier this century when generalized 
anticipatory relief through the declaratory judgment format was 
being routinized in American civil procedure, and the concern 
turned out to be groundless. Court proceedings are expensive, 
uncertain, awkward, public, and altogether unpleasant. There is 
no foundation for the idea that any significant segment of the 
populace would find the opportunity to litigate testamentary ca-
55. See text following note 39 supra. 
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pacity attractive.58 The further deterrent of the cost-shifting rule 
should eliminate all doubt on this point. 
4. Hearing and Decree 
As provided in present conservatorship procedure, any ap-
propriate medical examination would be conducted automati-
cally; the results would be made available in advance of hearing 
to the trier (and to the guardian ad litem and any other litigants). 
If persuaded that the testator possessed the requisite capacity 
and freedom from undue influence, the court would issue an ante-
mortem judgment that would be conclusive on the point in post-
mortem proceedings to probate the will. 
This version of living probate would also follow present con-
servatorship procedure and have the court determine testamen-
tary capacity without the use of a jury. In this respect Conserva-
torship Model living probate, which is otherwise oriented towards 
improving the defensive opportunities of potential challengers as 
compared to Contest Model procedure, would provide an impor-
tant improvement for the testator. 
A number of American jurisdictions provide a right to jury 
trial for persons resisting (involuntary) guardianship or conserva-
torship proceedings;57 the UPC leaves the jury right to local op-
tion in guardianship matters, 58 but does ·not employ jury proce-
dure in voluntary conservatorship proceedings. The petitioner 
seeking a protective regime has nothing to gain from jury trial, 
and the interests of others are too remote. In the context of living 
probate, nonjury procedure would also be advisable on strictly 
functional grounds, since the anticipatory format would bring 
about such a fundamental change in the nature of the proofs. In 
a conventional will contest convened when the testator is in his 
grave, the issue of his capacity at the time of the execution of the 
will has to be inferred from scattered evidence of conduct, cir-
cumstances, and condition, on which relatively little adjudicative 
expertise can be brought to bear, and which a panel of laymen 
might be thought to be able to try as well as a professional judge. 
In living probate, however, where the testator is available for 
56. On the other hand, just those factors that would make a testator loath to use 
living probate procedure should prevent the drawing of any negative inference from its 
nonuse. Contestants' burden should not be lightened on the ground that a testator did 
not put himself through costly, public, unpleasant living probate proceedings. 
57. See generally Annot., Constitutional Right to Jury Trial in Proceeding for Adjudi-
cation of Incompetency or Insanity or for Restoration, 33 A.L.R.2d 1145 (1954). 
58. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE§ 5-303(b). 
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testing, medical evidence will become vastly more central. A 
judge who deals regularly with the gerontology questions that 
recur in protective jurisdiction develops an adjudicative expertise 
to which juries cannot aspire. Living probate is too novel a cause 
of action for the heirs apparent to have any historic claim to jury 
trial, and there is no functional justification for it either. The 
analogy to existing conservatorship and probate jurisdiction rein-
forces the view that Conservatorship Model living probate be-
longs on the equity side of the law/equity test for jury rights. 
5. Revocation 
There has been a tendency in the literature and the legisla-
tion of Contest Model living probate to insist that court approval 
of testamentary capacity should somehow transform the particu-
lar will into a kind of "court will" requiring court approval for any 
subsequent revocation or amendment that the testator might 
decide to undertake. sg I doubt that the point would have practical 
importance, because most testators who are at once sufficiently 
prudent and well-counselled to have used living probate proce-
dure and sufficiently aged or decrepit to have needed it will not 
lightly venture out of the safe harbor that they will have achieved. 
The testator who uses living probate procedure will almost always 
be making his true "last will." Further, if the need for modifiGa-
tion does become inevitable, he and his lawyer are likely to under-
stand that the circumstances that made the use of living probate 
advisable in the first place are persisting, and that the procedure 
ought to be used again despite the nuisance and expense. How-
ever, as a matter of procedural law, there is no intrinsic reason60 
to impose particular requirements for the revocation or amend-
ment of a will that has been the subject of a successful living 
probate action. 
B. Testation Under Conservatorship Model Procedure 
To complete our sketch of this preferred format for living 
probate, we need to glance at certain of the interactions between 
the substantive law of testamentary capacity and the Conserva-
torship Model remedy scheme. 
59. E.g., N.D. CENT. ConE § 30.1-08.1-03 (Supp. 1977). 
60. When a Continental notarial execution and deposit scheme is in effect, the rule 
must be otherwise, e.g., for Germany, BfuwERLICHES GEBETZBUCH [BGB] § 2256; but I 
have explained, see text at notes 23-31 supra, why living probate need not be connected 
to and should not be confused with supervised execution and deposit. See also note 48 
supra. 
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1. '~ lunatic may draw a valid will. " 61 
Legislation and case law have distinguished three levels of 
capacity for three different judicial purposes. We need to pause 
briefly over this scale of substantive capacity law in order that it 
not confuse our own particular topic. 
As part of its laudable effort to disentangle conservatorship 
of the estate from guardianship of the person, the UPC is careful 
to separate the "disability" that occasions conservatorship from 
the "incapacity" that necessitates guardianship. The Official 
Comment says: "The purpose of guardianship is to provide for the 
care of a person who is unable to care for himself. There is no 
reason to seek a guardian in those situations where the problems 
to be dealt with center around the property of a disabled per-
son. " 62 A person who requires conservatorship of his financial 
affairs may still be competent to handle his domestic arrange-
ments. 
For purposes of writing a will there is a third standard, testa-
mentary capacity, which is universally regarded in the Anglo-
American authorities as the lowest-beneath the guardianship 
and conservatorship levels. Hence, as indicated in the language 
quoted in the heading to this section from a Florida opinion, the 
courts have on numerous occasions found that a person already 
adjudicated incompetent ("lunatic") ·for purposes of guardian-
ship or conservatorship nevertheless possessed adequate capacity 
to make a will. 83 A variety of explanations, none of them particu-
larly convincing, has been offered for this rule. It has been said, 
for example, that a lunatic needing sustained protection might 
still have "lucid intervals" in which he would be capable of for-
mulating testamentary intent." It has been said that since testa-
mentary dispositions will not render the person a public charge 
during his lifetime, there is less reason to interfere with them.85 
There is some hint that a person is thought to need more of his 
wits when engaged in a transaction, commercial or gratuitous, 
with a fully capable and self-interested person, but the counterar-
gument seems at least as attractive-that a testamentary disposi-
tion is more likely to be ill-considered than an inter vivos transfer 
61. Skelton v. Davis, 133 So. 2d 432, 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961). 
62. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-304 Comment; see generally UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
§§ 5-303, -401(2) & Comment. 
63. See Annot., Effect of Guardianship of Adult on Testamentary Capacity, 89 
A.L.R.2d 1120 (1963). 
64. See, e.g., Succession of Lanata, 205 La. 915, 18 So. 2d 500 (1944). 
65. Jenckes v. Court of Probate, 2 R.I. 255, 258 (1852). 
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because a will involves no present parti_ng with ownership or pos-
session. 
Regardless of its rationale, however, the rule that pitches the 
substantive standard of capacity for testation below the guardi-
anship and conservatorship levels has reinforced the division be-
tween inter vivos and testamentary jurisdiction-between protec-
tion and probate. Courts of protection have not had occasion to 
reach the precise question of testamentary capacity. This ex-
plains, for example, why the UPC presently excludes the power 
to make a will for a disabled person from the otherwise plenary 
powers of the conservatorship scheme, 66 and it also explains why 
inventive estate planners have found it so difficult to take advan-
tage of the existing protective jurisdiction in order to fashion 
some form of "do-it-yourself" living probate.67 
Nevertheless, it is easy to see why the lower substantive stan-
dard of testamentary capacity would pose no difficulty for a living 
probate system based upon the procedures of the court of protec-
tion. The present concern to prevent the two substantive stan-
dards from being jumbled would have no bearing on a procedure 
designed expressly to permit questions arising under the lower 
standard to be determined. What we have called Conservatorship 
Model living probate would on no account confuse the substan-
tive standard for conservatorship questions with that for testa-
tion. It would simply adapt the procedures used to determine the 
capacity of the living in protective jurisdiction for the procedural 
needs of the living testator. There are already common law juris-
dictions in which the court of protection is empowered to write68 
66. See UNIFORM PROBATE CooE § 5-408(3); text at note 46 supra. 
67. E.g., Pond's Estate v. Faust, 95 Wash. 346, 163 P. 753 (1917); Pond v. Faust, 90 
Wash. 117, 155 P. 776 (1916). For intimations of a more liberal view, see Cornia v. Cornia, 
546 P.2d 890 (Utah 1976), noted in ABA Committee on Trends, Probate and Trust Divi-
sion, Significant Current Trends in Probate and Trust Law-1977, 12 REAL PROP., PROB. 
& TRUST J. 528, 529 (1977). Evidence generated in the course of conservatorship proceed-
ings has been used to sustain testamentary capacity. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Brown, 186 Va. 
630, 44 S.E.2d 16 (1947). 
For an unsuccessful attempt to use existing declaratory judgment procedure to nullify 
the will of a living testator, see Cowan v. Cowan, 254 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Ct. App. 1952). 
68. For the English practice, see Re H.M.F., [1975] 2 All E.R. 795; Hunt & Reed, 
Statutory Wills for Mentally Disordered Persons, 34 CONVEYANCER & PROP. LAw. (n.s.) 150 
(1970). 
It has been pointed out by various students of living probate, including Cavers, supra 
note 6, at 448 n.27, and Alford, Some Major Problems in Alternatives to Probate, 32 REC. 
AssN. B. CITY N.Y. 53, 72-73 (1977), that federal law once made nominal provision for 
ante-mortem determinations of the testatmentary capacity of certain Indians. See DEPT. 
OF INTERIOR, U.S. INDIAN SERV., REGULATIONS RELATING TO THE DETERMINATION OF HEIRS AND 
APPROVAL OF WILLS § 53 (1915). It appears that ante-mortem review of Indian wills was 
abandoned in 1923. See DEPT. OF INTERIOR, U.S. INDIAN SERv., REGULATIONS RELATING TO 
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or to prevent the writing89 of a "'.ill. We can be confident, there-
fore, that the lower substantive standard fits easily enough into 
the procedural model that we have been recommending. 
2. Undue Influence 
Broadly speaking, two major theories may be advanced in 
testamentary capacity litigation in present post-mortem will con-
tests; they are commonly known as the "unsound mind" and the 
"undue influence" doctrines. 70 We have seen why living probate 
is especially apt for the unsound mind case, in which the essential 
issue is the general mental condition of the testator. In the undue 
influence case, the typical allegation is that a wrongdoer took 
advantage of the testator's condition to importune him into mak-
ing or enlarging a testamentary provision for the wrongdoer. Be-
cause such a case turns as much on the wrongdoer's conduct as 
on the testator's condition, it involves proofs that may be much 
wider than the medical evidence of testator's condition that living 
probate is well-suited to generate. It can be suggested, therefore, 
that living probate should be confined to the unsound mind cases. 
Many factors point in the opposite direction, however, and 
I think that the recent North Dakota statute, like living probate 
proposals of the past, has taken the correct position in providing 
for a declaration of "the testamentary capacity and freedom from 
undue influence of the person executing the will."71 Two features 
of the Conservatorship Model living probate that we have de-
scribed make the system well suited to flushing out any wrong-
doer who would be brazen enough to contemplate having a cap-
tive testator procure a living probate decree in order to immunize 
a tainted will. The will is disclosed with the living probate peti-
tion, so that the unnatural disposition would show on the face of 
the litigation documents at the outset of the proceeding, and the 
procedure envisions a guardian ad litem and a court with powers 
to investigate suspicions of undue influence. Failure to extend the 
res judicata effect of the living probate decree to the undue influ-
ence theory would undermine most of the reform, since it is so 
THE DETERMINATION OF HEIRS AND APPROVAL OF WILLS § 37 (1923). I have not been able to 
locate in the published materials any evidence that the authority to review wills for 
capacity ante-mortem was put to use. See DIGEST OF FEDERAL INDIAN PROBATE LAW (1972), 
with its marvelously named testators (e.g., Alexander Stinking Bear, Lucy Little Tail, 
Great Deal/Plenty Woman). 
69. See In re Estate of Bechtold, 150 N.J. Super. 550, 376 A.2d 211 (Ch. Div. 1977). 
70. See generally T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF WILLS 232-41, 255-62 (2d ed. 
1953). 
71. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-01 (Supp. 1977). 
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easy (and so common) to tack an undue influence count to an 
unsound mind claim. 72 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article accords with a long tradition of scholarship in 
recognizing the need for a living probate system. The particular 
thesis that I have put forth is that the difficuJt procedural prob-
lems that arise if living probate is constructed in the format of 
an anticipatory will contest are neatly avoided by modelling the 
system upon existing procedures for determining the capacity of 
the living in protective jurisdiction. This Conservatorship Model 
living probate in the form that I have described it serves the needs 
of the testator as well as Contest Model procedure ( even better if 
the avoidance of jury trial is regarded as an improvement); the 
procedure is much more sensitive to preserving family harmony; 
it cures the defensive awkwardness of Contest Model procedure; 
and it contains important internal constraints against overuse. 
The geriatric revolution is allowing ever larger numbers of 
people to reach the age of declining physical and mental condi-
tion. Old age is not a good time oflife to do one's estate planning, 
but circumstances may always arise in which an elderly or af-
flicted person will have no choice but to revise or to make a will .. 
We cannot expect that everyone will have the double good for-
tune to do his estate planning in the prime of life, and then to 
enjoy tranquil family and financial affairs that give him no cause 
to revise his will. The testator who has cause to fear that his 
physical and mental condition will be made the basis for extor-
tionate post-mortem litigation challenging his testamentary 
capacity has a moral claim on the legal system to provide him 
with the means of preventing the depredation. I hope to have 
shown the way out of the procedural problems that have side-
lined the living probate remedy in the past. The relatively few 
testators who need living probate ought to be allowed it under a 
procedure that safeguards all the re_levant interests. 
72. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 70, at 253-55. 
